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THE UNHAPPY HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Eugene Gressman*

T

enforcement by federal legislation of the constitutional right&
of individuals is a story written largely in terms of confusion, distortion and frustration. Seldom, if ever, have the power and the purposes of legislation been rendered so impotent. Indeed, this story constitutes one of the saddest chapters in the historic struggle to effectuate
the American ideal of freedom and equality for all.
HE

Act I-The Legislative Prelude
Congressional implementation of the constitutional promises of
freedom encompasses but a brief span of nine years, 1866 to 1875.
Prior to that period the Constitution protected fundamental personal
rights only against infringement by the federal government. This protection, embodied primarily in the first ten amendments, was not designed to be a sword or a shield against infringement either by the states
or by individuals. And it was a protection essentially negative in character, permitting individuals to assert their rights only as a defense to
some sort of governmental action. Such limited guarantees reflected
the early fears of a powerful central government and the early reliance
on the states as the protectors of the individual's rights and liberties.
The Civil War and its aftermath, however, wrought great changes
in the constitutional framework of civil rights. The victory of the
northern armies meant the effective end of slavery as a legalized institution. The slavery debate, which had so long embroiled the halls of
Congress, receded into nothingness. In its place came a vigorous controversy over the federalist or nationalist tendencies of the abolitionists
as they moved to consolidate their victory. This great controversy resulted in three new constitutional amendments and five congressional
statutes supplementary thereto, all of which went beyond the immediate
problems created by the emancipation of the Negro and caused a most
profound shift in the status of the federal government relative to the
civil rights of all inhabitants. The abolitionists and the Republican
party reacted violently to the feeling of anti-federalism which had so
long marked this area of human freedom. The states' rights doctrine
suffered a complete albeit temporary eclipse. The national government
no longer ,,vas viewed as the prime threat to civil liberties. Rather it
"' Member, District of Columbia and Michigan Bars.-Ed.
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was looked upon as the defender of the individual from assaults on his
freedom stemming from state or private action. The nationalistic implications of the abolitionist movement came to their full fruition.
The first episode in this constitutional uphea;al was the adoption
and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, ratification occurring
on December 18, 1865.1 This amendment abolished both slavery and
involuntary servitude throughout the nation and gave Congress the
power to make its provisions effective by appropriate legislation. Here
for the first time was a constitutional command respecting individual
freedom which was not confined in its reach to the federal government.
It was also directed to the states. And, most significantly, it was direct'.ed to private individuals. As the Supreme Court noted, this
amendment was "not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or
upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States."2
The opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment attacked it as an unjustifiable in'Zasion of the rights of the states and an undue extension of
the power of the federal government. Indeed, it was argued that the
amendment was so drastic in this respect as to destroy the federal
character of the government and to be inconsistent with the whole spirit
of the Constitution.3 These opponents assumed, as did the proponents,
that the amendment was of a sweeping nature, that it went beyond the
outlawry of personal bondage and guaranteed the emancipated Negro
certain minimum rights, -and that Congress would be enabled to safe:
guard and protect those rights by legislation. The guaranteed rights
l But see Hamilton, ''The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment," 9 NAT. BAR J. 26 at 47-48 (1951), contending that December 9 rather than December 18, 1865, is the correct date of ratification.
2 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 at 20, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883). It has also been pointed
out that: ''The Amendment nullified two parts of the Constitution: the fugitive slave and
the three-fifths provisions. The former (Article IV, Section 2) provided for the rendition
of 'any person held to service or labor' who should :Hee to another state. The much controverted fugitive slave act of 1850 had been repealed in 1864. The three-fifths provision
(Article 1, Section 2), one of the famous compromises of 1787, stated that in apportiqning direct taxes and representation in the House of Representatives the respective numbers
should include three-fifths of all 'other persons,' that is, slaves. Thus a consequence of the
Amendment was an increase in the southern representation by about twenty seats. This
prospect worried the Republicans, quickened their interest in Negro suffrage, and produced
the section in the Fourteenth Amendment penalizing by a reduction in representation any
state denying suffrage to Negroes." Hamilton, "The Legislative and Judicial History of
the Thirteenth Amendment," 9 NAT. BAR J. 26 at 56 (1951). See, in general, Tenbroek,
"The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States-Consummation
to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment,'' 39 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 171 (1951).
3 See, for example, the remarks of Rep. Fernando Wood, Democrat of New York,
CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2941 (1864).
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were thought to include equality before the law, protection in life and
person, and free opportunity to live, work and move about. 4 And the
slavery to be abolished by the amendment was to include the incidents
of the system which impaired and destroyed the civil rights of white
persons. White citizens residing in the South and sympathizing with
the Negro or the North were to be freed of the kidnapping, imprisoning, mobbing and murdering which the slavery system had spawned.5
Thus, in the eyes of its supporters and opponents, the Thirteenth
Amendment was the final step in the long campaign to end slavery and
all its incidents. Not only were the Negro and his white friends to be
protected in their privileges and civil liberties but the federal government was to be the effective means for achieving and perpetuating those
ends through appropriate legislation.
But the need for legislative appendages to the Thirteenth Amendment became almost immediately apparent. Something more than
the idealistic words of the amendment was essential. Widespread atrocities against the free Negroes and their white friends continued in the
South. Most southern legislatures enacted Black Codes, the many
restrictions of which resulted in forcing Negroes to work for their
former masters or other white men. 6 The Negro in effect remained a
slave in all but the constitutional sense. By virtue of these codes, he
was "socially an outcast, industrially a serf, legally a separate and oppressed class."1
The Reconstruction politicians became aroused at this resurgence
of the Dred Scott philosophy,8 a philosophy which declared that Negroes were not citizens of the United States and had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect. The 39th Congress, convening in
December 1865, witnessed a variety of proposals, all designed to strike
down the offensive Black Codes. The preceding Congress had established the Freedmen's Bureau to guard the general welfare and interests of former slaves; some of the proposals looked toward a strengthening of the bureau, which had proved weak and ineffective. But the
4 TENBROEK, THE ANnsLAVERY OruGINs OP THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT 142-143
(1951).
5 Id. at 149-150.
6 MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS oP THE NEGRO 26-27 (1940); Biddle, "Civil Rights
and the Federal Law," fa SAFEGUARDING C!vIL LmERTY ToDAY 109 at 116 (1945); Hamilton, "The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment," 9 NAT. BAR J.
26 at 61-62 (1951).
7 TENBROEK, Tm ANnsLAVERY OruGINs oP THE FounTEENTH AMENDMENT 163
(1951).
8 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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Republican program for the new Congress was broader in its civil rights
conception than these various proposals. It went beyond a mere nullification of the Black Codes and a buttressing of the bureau. It was a
program rooted in the new Thirteenth Amendment and was made applicable to all people, though immediately and primarily of aid to the
'freedmen. The time had come to exercise the congressional power to
effectuate the amendment, with all its broad aspirations, by appropriate
legislation.
The heart of this legislative program was a civil rights bill and a
proposed amendment to the Freedmen's Bureau Act. These two bills
represented the efforts of the amendment's framers, acting almost simultaneously with its ratification, to implement the intentions of the amendment. 9 These two proposals were essentially the same, seeking to effectuate the amendment by protecting the civil rights and immunities of all
people directly through the federal government. Section I of the civil
rights bill and section 7 of the Freedmen's Bureau bill had identical lists
of the civil rights to be guaranteed by the national government:
I. The right to make and enforce contracts;
2. The right to buy, sell and own realty and personalty;
3. The right to sue, be parties and give evidence; and
4. The right to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property.
Neither bill was designed exclusively for the benefit of Negroes. The
Freedmen'~ Bureau bill extended the services of the bureau in protecting these rights to "refugees and freedmen in all parts of the United
States," while the civil rights bill covered "the inhabitants of any state
or territory of the United States." Moreover, both state action and state
inaction fell within the ambit of these bills. And so did private, individual action. The evidence before Congress at this time was replete
with instances of private individuals committing outrages and atrocities
on freedmen and their white sympathizers.10
Together, these bills effectively nationalized the civil rights of all
inhabitants of the United States, white or colored. They culminated
the abolitionist concept of the federal government as the protector of
the essential principles of liberty. But then a strange thing happened.
9 See Fairman and Morrison, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights?" 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 at 7 (1949). See also Frank and Munro, "The Original
Understanding of 'Equal Protection of Laws,'" 50 CoL. L. REv. 131 (1950).
l0TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 163164 (1951).
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The opponents of these bills, the same persons who had opposed adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment on the assumption that it incorporated the broad abolitionist doctrines, grounded their attack on a strict
construction of the amendment. In their revised view, the amendment
did no more than eliminate the relationship of master and slave; hence
the bills, in revolutionizing the federal-state relationship as to civil
rights, were unauthorized by the Thirteenth Amendment or by any
other provision of the Constitution.1 '
Those favoring the two proposals, of course, were consistent in
their broad interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The rights
specified in these bills were said to be merely those guaranteed by the
Amendment-the natural rights of man as set forth in the Declaration
of Independence and the privileges and immunities of citizens flowing
from the comity clause of the Constitution (art. IV, sec. 2). They
argued that the opposite of slavery is freedom, that the Thirteenth
Amendment established that freedom by abolishing slavery, and that
the freedom so established consisted of the rights which had been
denied the slaves and which were now spelled out in the two bills.
And to them the concept of equal protection of the laws, which was so
prominent in their philosophy and in their framing of the proposals,
meant an affirmative, full protection of all the laws rather than a mere
comparative equality.12
In the words of Senator Trumbull, the principal draftsman of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the civil rights bill, under that amendment "Congress is bound to see that freedom is in fact secured to
every person throughout the land; he must be fully protected in all
his rights of person and property; and any legislation or any public
sentiment which deprived any human being in the land of those great
rights of liberty will be in defiance of the Constitution; and if the states
and local authorities, by legislation or otherwise, deny those rights, it is
incumbent on us to see that they are secured."13
11 Id. at 164-165.
12 Fairman and Morrison,

''Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?" 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 at 16-18 (1949).
13 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., p. 77 (1866). Senator Lane stated: "They
[the Negroes] are free by the constitutional amendment lately enacted and entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of other free citizens of the United States. It is made your
especial duty by the second section of that amendment, by appropriate legislation, to carry
out that emancipation. If that second section were not embraced in the amendment at all
your duty would be as strong, the duty would be paramount, to protect them in all rights
as free and manumitted people. I do not consider that the second section of that amendment does anything but declare what is the duty of Congress, after having passed such
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to secure them in all their rights and
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The civil rights bill became the Act of April 9, 1866,14 being enacted over the veto of President Johnson. It wrote into law that persons
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power were
citizens of the United States, thereby overruling the Dred Scott decision.15 It further provided that such citizens, without regard to color,
were entitled in every state and territory to the same right to contract,
sue, give evidence, and take, hold and convey property, and to the equal
benefit of all laws for the security of person and property, as was enjoyed by white citizens; and any person who under color of law Cq.used
any such civil right to be denied would be guilty of a federal offense.
The Thirteenth Amendment also provided the basis for another
important though less controversial statute, the Anti-peonage Act of
March 2, 1867. This law "resulted from practices found to prevail in
the Territory of New Mexico and inherited from the days of Spanish
;rule, but went beyond the particular evil involved and prohibited the
holding of anyone in involuntary servitude anywhere in the United
States. This is still a living law, used to eliminate the various indirect
methods by which many persons of low economic status in many of the
states have been forced to labor for a particular employer against their
will."16 The validity of this statute has never been in serious question
and it has on occasion been used in conjunction with the Thirteenth
Amendment to strike down offending state laws.17
Litigation. under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 found most courts
willing to accept its constitutionality,1 8 although there were a few decisions to the contrary.19 But the doubts raised by the congressional
opponents had a telling effect and many of the advocates of nationalization of civil rights felt none too secure Constitution-wise. Moreover,
some of these advocates concluded that the rights secured by the 1866
privileges. • • • What are the objects sought to be accomplished by this bill? That these
freedmen shall be secured in the possession of all the rights, privileges, and immunities of
free men; in other words, that we shall give effect to the proclamation of emancipation and
to the constitutional amendment." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., p. 602 (1866).
14 14 Stat. L. 27. President Johnson's veto of the Freedmen's Bureau was sustained
by the Senate.
15 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
16 Biddly, "Civil Rights and the Federal Law," in SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY ToDAY 109 at 119 (1945).
17 See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145 (1910); Taylor v. Georgia,
315 U.S. 25, 62 S.Ct. 415 (1942); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 64 S.Ct. 792 (1944).
1s United States v. Rhodes, (C.C. Ky. 1866) Fed. Cas. No. 16,151; In re Turner,
(C.C. Md. 1867) Fed. Cas. No. 14,247; Hart v. Hoss & Elder, 26 La. Ann. 90 (1874);
Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299 (1866); People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869).
· 19Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. 5 (1867); People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198 (1870).
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act should be placed beyond the possibility of repeal by any later Congress. They felt that the centralizing of civil rights authority in the federal government should be made a permanent part of our constitutional
way of life rather than remain dependent upon the Huctuating discretion of succeeding Congresses.20
These doubts as- to the adequacy of the Thirteenth Amendment and
the 1866 act became so acute that it was soon deemed advisable to recast the provisions in a more detailed mold of a new constitutional
amendment. Such was the motivating factor that led to the birth of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Its proponents, fresh from the legislative
battles of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 1866 Civil Rights Act and
the Freedmen's Bureau bill, desired to solidify their intentions. They
wished, by virtue of a new constitutional provision, to make certain that
civil rights would be truly nationalized, that the federal government
would inject itself into this realm that had hitherto been exclusively
reserved to the states, and that all individuals would be protected in
the full and equal enjoyment of the rights of person and property.
More specifically, the provisions and implications of the 1866 act were
meant to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
It was also evident from the start that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had in mind more than the outlawing of state action which
abused civil rights. The amendment sprang from the efforts of the congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 21 This committee studied the various suggestions made as to wording the new provision and
also held formal hearings on the conditions then existing in the South.
These hearings were significant in that they revealed that most of the
abuses still being suffered by the Negro were at the hands of individual white persons rather than state governments or those acting under
color of state law. Such private invasions of civil liberties were testified to by the vast majority of the 125 witnesses appearing before the
committee. 22 These hearings further demonstrated that the.Negro was
not alone in his tribulations; white persons who had supported the
Union cause or who were bold enough to advocate civil rights for the
20 TENBROEK, Tm; ANnsLAVERY Oru:Grns OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT

183-

185 (1951).
21 For the full story of the legislative developments and debates leading to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, see FLACK, THE ADoPTLON OF nm FoURTEBN'I'H
AMENDMENT (1908); WARsoFF, EQUALITY AND THE LAw (1938); JAMEs, FRAMING OF
THE FoURTEEN'I'H AMENDMENT (1939); Fairman and Morrison, "Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?" 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). See also KENDRICK, THE JoURNAL OF THE JOINT CoMMlTTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION (1914).
22WARsOFF, EQUALITY AND THE LAw 109-II0 (1938).
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Negro were also the victims of terrorism in the South. 23 These factors
were thus clearly in the minds of the committee members when they
drafted the all-important first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The demonstrated fact that violations of civil rights were primarily the
product of individual rather than state-.action made it unreasonable for
the committee to limit the scope of the amendment to state actio~. In
fact, the committee's report, 24 recommending "such changes of the
organic law as shall determine the civil rights and privileges of all citizens in all parts of the republic," made plain t71e universal scope of
the amendment. The subsequent debates in Congress implicitly assumed that individual action, not just state action, was covered by the
amendment.
The various proposals for wording the Fourteenth Amendment ran
from a simple prohibition of discrimination in state or national laws
.on account of race or color to a granting of power to Congress to secure
to all persons "full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property."25 The contrast here was between a flat constitutional prohibition
and a broad grant of power to Congress. But the basic idea of equal or
full protection of the laws was present in all proposals. The final draft,
as presented to the states for ratification, was something of a compromise.
It contained both a constitutional prohibition and an allocation of power
to Congress. The first section contained but eighty words, all of them
designed to give national protection to persons or citizens in their
natural rights:
.
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the· United States.and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any pers~n within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
This section was intended to be read in connection with the fifth section of the amendment, which gave Congress the power to enforce the
amendment "by appropriate legislation."
The remarks in Congress concerning the first section, while meager,
revealed the consistently broad intentions of the amendment's support23 See FLACK, THE .ADOPTION oP THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 72 (1908).
24 REPORT OP THE JOINT CoMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, p. xxi (1866).
25 The various forms of the proposed amendment are set forth by TENBROEK,
ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OP THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

187-190 (1951).
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ers. The early drafts had been in a more positive form in ,vhich Congress was directly authorized to secure to all persons the equal protection of the laws and to all citizens their privileges and immunities. Repeated statements on the floor of Congress revealed that this form of
the equal protection clause related to the obligation of government to
protect men in their natural rights and that such protection, when supplied, must be equal to all. 26 But the final draft was much more negative in form. The prohibitions were made primarily on the states, with
power being granted Congress to make such prohibitions effective by
appropriate legislation. Just what was the purpose of this shift?
Congressional speakers made plain that section I of the final draft
was designed to make certain that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
constitutionally valid, 21 a proposition which naturally drew forth the
old charge that an undue amount of power \'\1as being concentrated in
the federal government. But more than this was essential to the promoters of nationalized civil rights. Some future Congress might repeal
the 1866 act and leave these rights shorn of federal protection. To
eliminate that possibility required that the provisions of the act in some
,vay be inserted into the new amendment itself.28 To do that entailed
2 6 This form of the proposed amendment was said to give "the power to Congress to
enact those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States the natural rights which
necessarily pertain to citizenship. It is intended to enable Congress by its enactment when
necessary to give to a citizen of the United States, in whatever state he may be, those privileges and immunities which are guaranteed to him under the Constitution of the United
States. It is intended to enable Congress to give to all citizens the inalienable rights of life
and liberty, and to every citizen in whatever state he may he that protection to his property
which is extended to the other citizens of the state." Statement of Rep. Woodbridge, CoNG.
Gr.oBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1088 (1866).
27 Rep. Eliot stated: "I support the first section because the doctrine it declares is
right, and if, under the Constitution as it now stands, Congress has not the power to prohibit State legislation discriminating against classes of citizens or depriving any persons of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying to any persons within the
State the equal protection of the laws, then, in my judgment, such power should be distinctly conferred. I voted for the civil rights bill, and I did so under a conviction that we
have ample power to enact into law the provisions of that bill. But I shall gladly do what
I may to incorporate into the Constitution provisions which will settle the doubt which
some gentlemen entertain upon that question." CoNG. Gr.oBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., p.
2511 (1866).
28 See statement of Rep. Garfield, 39th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2462 (1866): "The civil
rights bill is now a part of the law of the land. But every gentleman knows that it will
cease to be a part of the law whenever the sad moment arrives when that gentleman's
party [the Democratic] comes into power. It is precisely for that reason that we propose
to lift that great and good law above the reach of political strife, beyond the reach of the
plots and machinations of any party, and fix it in the serene sky, in the eternal firmament
of the Constitution, where no storm of passion can shake it and no cloud can obscure it.
For this reason, and not because I believe the civil rights bill unconstitutional, I am glad
to see that first section here."
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more than a simple grant of power to Congress to secure civil rights,
which was what the early drafts of the amendment had done. So an
outright prohibition was framed. Since Congress was already prohibited by other sections of the Constitution from encroaching upon these
rights, the new prohibition was addressed to the states, combined with
a grant of enforcement power to Congress. Such a prohibition was
believed to be effective as to individual action, for if the state did not
act to curb or punish the individual violators there would be state
inaction of the type comprehended by the amendment, and Congress
could then provide adequate remedies.
The first sentence of the amendment, making all persons born or
naturalized in the United States "citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside," was added in the final stages of the
amendment's development and was drawn from the 1866 act. 29 It was
feared that without such a definition of citizenship there might be an
effort some day to take away from the Negro the protection of the
amendment by declaring him not be a citizen, as the Dred Scott decision had done. And so the definition was added. National citizenship
was thereby made primary and independent, while state citizenship was
relegated to a secondary, derivative status.30 Such a concept of a paramount national citizenship to which fundamental rights adhered had
been the basis of the 1866 act and had been implicit in the whole
movement to nationalize civil rights. It was the necessary premise of all
the remainder of the first section of the amendment, especially the privileges and immunities clause. The latter clause, forbidding the states
from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, has real meaning only against a background of national citizenship accompanied by the basic rights of the individual. The promoters
of the Fourteenth Amendment were not interested in prohibiting the
states from interfering with the narrow, technical relationships of a
citizen to the federal government. They were desirous of precluding
the states from impinging upon the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. And they thought of those rights as necessarily
belonging to national citizenship, rights which they labelled privileges
and immunities.
In light of subsequent developments, it is unfortunate that the
framers of the amendment did not give a more definite indication as
29 See FLACK, THE AnoPnON OF THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT 83-84, 88-90 (1908);
Frantz, ''Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment," 9 LAWYERS GUILD REv. 122 at 123
(1949).
30 CORWIN, THE CoNsnTUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS ToDAY, 8th ed., 180 (1946).
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to the privileges and immunities which were intended to be placed
under the protective umbrella of the federal government. The phrase
"privileges or immunities" referred plainly enough, in the framers'
minds, to the fundamental rights of man, enumerated at least in part
in the provisions of the 1866 act. They felt that the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution itself had made self-evident the
great rights which attached to those in allegiance to the federal government. And they knew that as long ago as 1823 the phrase "privileges
and immunities of citizens," as used in article IV, section 2, of the
Constitution had been judicially interpreted to include all fundamental
rights. 31 Moreover, they may have feared that to enumerate the rights
once again in the Fourteenth Amendment was not only redundant but
might close the list and prevent subsequent recognition and protection
of additional rights.
In any event, it was the privileges and immunities clause which the
framers regarded as the core of section 1 of the amendment. The equal
protection and due process clauses were treated by them as of secondary
importance, as appendages to the protection afforded the privileges and
immunities or the fundamental rights of national citizenship. Those
clauses simply meant that in guaranteeing the basic human rights covered by the privileges and immunities clause, the federal government
was to see to it that these rights .were recognized and effectuated by
the states on an equal basis and that any necessary deprivation of those
rights by the states was in accordance with basic principles of procedural
due process.
Such was the intended nature of the Fourteenth Amendment upon
its ratification on July 28, 1868. Less than two years later, on March
30, 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified. This constitutional
addition stated that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," with
power being given Congress to enforce the amendment by appropriate
legislation.
Congress then made several bold efforts to enforce the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments "by appropriate legislation." On May 31,
1870, a new Civil Rights Act was passed.32 This statute reenacted the
1866 act under the belief that whatever doubts may have previously
31 Corfield v. Coryell, (C.C. Pa. 1823) Fed. Cas. No. 3230, opinion by Justice Washington on circuit.
3 2 16 Stat. L. 140. On February 28, 1871, an amendment to the 1870 act was adopted,
making a variety of additions. 16 Stat. L. 433.
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existed as to constitutional validity were now removed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It also added criminal penalties for depriving anyone of the rights enumerated in the earlier law. In addition, the 1870
act made elaborate provisions to effectuate the right of free suffrage
without distinction as to race, color or previous condition of servitude.
Criminal sanctions were attached to any interference with an inhabitant's right to qualify as a voter, to register or to vote. A conspiracy
section was added, punishing as a felony conspiracies to violate the
statute or to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen with
intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right
or privilege granted. or secured to him by .the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
On April 20; 1871, Congress passed another statute ''to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."33
_Known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, this statute was the indignant reaction
of Congress to conditions in the southern states wherein the Klan and
other lawless elements were rendering life and property insecure. Both
civil and criminal penalties were established· for the deprivation of
rights under color of law. The pith of the act was section 2, making it
an offense to "conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose . . . of depriving
any person or any· class of persons of the equal protection .of the laws,
. or equal privileges or immunities under the laws." If state authorities
were unable or unwilling to prevent the deprivation of a constitutional
right, a:nd violence resulted, the President was empowered to take
appropriate measures to suppress the violence. Moreover, the person
whose civil rights were injured was given a civil cause of action against
the officer who should have but did not protect him, a provision which
was specifically directed against lynching a:nd other forms of mob
violence.
The capstone of the congressional civil rights program came on
March l, 1875, with the adoption of "An act to protect all citizens in
their civil and legal rights." 34 The preamble stated that it was essential
to just government that "we recognize the equality of all men before
the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in all its dealings
with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever
nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or political," and that it
was "the appropriate object of legislation to enact great fundamental
33
34

I 7 Stat. L. 13.
18 Stat. L. 335.
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principles into law." Section I of the new law required all inns, public
conveyances, theaters, and other places of public amusement to open
their accommodations and privileges to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," subject only to legal conditions applicable
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of .any previous
condition of servitude. 35 Section 2 made a violation of this provision
a misdemeanor and gave the injured person the right to recover a $500
penalty for each offense. Federal courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under this statute, with all cases being reviewable
by the Supreme Court regardless of the sum of money involved.
Here was the most penetrating of all the civil rights statutes. It was
confirmatory of the principles which motivated the adoption of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment, it will be recalled, was designed to do more than illegalize personal bondage. The intention was also to remove the badges and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude. Freedom from slavery
meant freedom to exercise civil rights without discrimination based
upon race or previous condition of servitude. The 1875 statute was
molded so as to effectuate that principle where discrimination was practiced by individuals in the exercise of public or quasi-public functions.
Public conveyances, inns, theaters and other places 0£ public amusement fell into the public or quasi-public category by their very nature
and by virtue of the various governmental controls traditionally exercised over them. To be deprived of their services because of race or
previous condition of servitude was truly thought to be a badge of
slavery which could be eradicated. The 1875 law was also framed in
accordance with the idealistic formula of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Negroes were undeniably citizens of the United States and of the states
wherein they resided by virtue of the first sentence of that amendment.
Hen<.:e they were entitled to all the fundamental rights which national
citizenship was thought to entail. And they were also entitled to the
benefits of the comity clause (art. IV, sec. 2), providing that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities
3:; " ••• the essence of the law is, not to declare broadly that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances and theatres; but that such enjoyment shall not be
subject to conditions applicable only to citizens of a particular race or color, or who had
been in a previous condition of servitude. The effect of the statute . . . is, that colored
citizens, whether formerly slaves or not, and citizens of other races, shall have the same
accommodations and privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement
as are enjoyed by white citizens; and vice versa." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 at 27,
3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
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of citizens in the several states." Viewed either as national citizens or
state citizens, Negroes possessed the right to be free from :i;ace discrimination with respect to civil rights enjoyed by white citizens. And
Congress had power, given it by the fifth section of the amendment, to
enforce that right. The 1875 act was an exercise of that power.
· Such were the congressional efforts from 1866 to 1875 to make
secure the constitutional ideals of freedom and equality for all. Never
before or since has there been so much important federal legislation
regarding civil rights. The changes made by this series of enactments
and constitutional additions were of a most significant nature, altering
substantially the balance between state and federal power. Civil rights
were conceived of as inherent ingredients of national citizenship and
as such were entitled to federal protection. And that protection was to
be accorded in an affirmative fashion. Congress made what "was probably the first attempt in the history of mankind to destroy the branches
of slavery after its root had been destroyed."35 a The federal government
was given effective weapons to combat and defend against all who
would deprive inhabitants of the United States of their rights to be free
of inequalities and distinctions based on race, color and previous condition of senritude. These weapons were usable against both private
individuals and those acting under color of state law.
As stated in Justice Swayne's dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 36
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, in the light
of their true purposes, "are a new departure, and mark an important
epoch in the constitutional history of the country. They trench directly
upon the power of the States, and deeply affect those bodies. They are,
in this respect, at the opposite pole from the :6.rst eleven. Fairly construed, these amendments may be said to rise to the dignity of a new
Magna Charta."

Act II-The Judicial Coup d'Etat
But even before 1875, when Congress finished building this comprehensive structure of nationalized civil rights, corrosive elements were
fast at work, elements which were eventually to leave the structure in
ruins. The builders, £red with the combined zeal of the abolitionist
movement, the post-war hatreds and the Reconstruction politics, had
unfortunately left gaping structural weaknesses in their handiwork.
THE CoNsTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 at 125 (1873).

35a KoNVITZ,
36
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They meant well. But their minds moved faster and more precisely
than their hands. 37 The result was that the loose, unprecise language
that had been written into the constitutional additions, particularly the
Fourteenth Amendment, permitted the enemies of nationalized civil
rights to persuade the strict constructionists of the judiciary that the
amendments did not say what the framers had meant them to say. Soon
the bold motives and the brave arguments of the architects of the constitutional revolution in civil rights were forgotten under the din of a
judicial rewriting of their efforts.
The most far-reaching incident of this counter-revolution came
in 1873 in the Slaughterhouse Cases. By the narrow margin of five
votes to four, the Supreme Court twisted beyond recognition the intended meaning of the crucial privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The effect was that the broad application of
that amendment that was necessary to sustain the civil rights program
of Congress was rendered impossible.
The Slaughterhouse Cases did not directly involve any of the civil
rights statutes. But the constructon there given the privileges and
immunities clause went to the very constitutional heart of those statutes. At immediate stake was a Louisiana law creating a monopoly in
a single corporation for slaughtering animals. The Court upheld the
validity of the monopoly grant on the ground that it was an appropriate
exercise of the state's police power to protect the health of the community. In so doing, the Court was met with the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment had given primary national citizenship to Louisiana
citizens and had provided that no state could abridge their privileges
and immunities, among which was the privilege of engaging in the
lawful business of slaughtering animals. The majority of the Court
refused to accept this argument.
Justice Miller, speaking for the majority, said that only national
citizenship received any protection from the privileges and immunities
clause and that such national citizenship did not comprehend any of
. the fundamental rights of the individual. Those rights adhered only to
state citizenship. To bring civil rights under the concept of national
citizenship, as the framers intended, would in the Court's opinion be
"so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our institution"
37 The recent words of Justice Frankfurter are apposite in this connection: "The
dominant conditions of the Reconstruction Period were not conducive to the enactment of
carefully considered and coherent legislation. Strong post-war feelings caused inadequate
deliberation and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws related to the new political
issues." United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 at 74, 71 S.Ct. 581 (1951).
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and would so "fetter and degrade the State governments" that it would
not be permitted "in the absence of language which expresses such
purpose too clearly to admit of doubt."
National citizenship, as construed by the Court, included only
those few rights which were beyond the possible reach of state citizenship and which grew out of "the relationship between the citizen and
the national government, created by the Constitution and federal laws."
Included were such as the right to travel to the national capitol, the
right to sue in federal courts, the right to free access to the subtreasuries
and the right to protection abroad and on the high seas. But these were
rights that had no practical relationship to the cruel violence which
marked the infringements of civil rights in the South and which gave
rise to the amendment. They were rights that were already constitutionally protected from state infringement by virtue of the supremacy
clause (art. IV, clause 2). In short, as Justice Field stated in his dissent,38 the privileges and immunities clause was rendered "a vain and
idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily
excited Congress and the people on its passage."
The decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases has never been reversed.
The Fourteenth Amendment to this day has never recovered its life
blood which the Court there extracted from it. Completely shattered
was the privileges and immunities clause upon which rested the intricate pattern qf nationally protected civil rights. The criminal sections
of the civil rights statutes that relied on that clause to put teeth into
such national protection were doomed. For all practical purposes the
privileges and immunities clause passed into the realm of historical
oddities. 39 In case after case the Supreme Court adhered to its stultifying interpretation, save for an abortive attempt in 1935 to utilize a
pale shadow of the clause's intended power. 40 . Efforts were made in
38 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 at 96. For a critical analysis of this case, see BoUDIN, GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, C. 23 (1932).
39 See, in general, Meyers, "Federal Privileges and Immunities: Application to Ingress
and Egress," 29 CoRN. L.Q. 489 (1944); McGovney, "Privileges and Immunities Clause,"
4 lowA L. BuL. 219 (1918); Howard, ''Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship
and Colgate v. Haivey," 87 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 262 (1939); note, 39 CoL. L. REv. 1237
(1939).
40 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252 (1935), sUiprisingly used the
privileges and mununities clause to outlaw a Vermont statute imposing a discriminatory tax
on loans made outside the state. The precise nature of that decision has never been clear,
but the doubts were soon thereafter made moot by an express overruling of the case in
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S.Ct. 406 (1940), noted in 38 MicH. L. REv. 720
(1940). Justice Roberts' opinion in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939),
stated that the right to assemble to discuss the National Labor Relations Act and benefits
thereunder was a privilege of national citizenship guaranteed by the Constitution, but these
views were not adopted by the Court.
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vain to secure the Court's approval of the clause to protect the rights
mentioned in the first eight amendrnents. 41
The judicially directed perversion of what the abolitionists tried to
write into the Constitution did not stop with the Slaughterhouse Cases.
Hard on the heels of that decision came United States v. Crnikshank. 4 :1
The Court there applied the Slaughterhouse doctrine directly to an
alleged violation of a Negro's fundamental right to assemble. It held
that an indictment under the conspiracy section of the 1870 act was
defective in failing to allege that the right claimed to have been violated
was one growing out of the Negro's relationship to the federal government. Unless an assemblage of Negroes were "for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the national government," a
conspiracy to interfere with their right to assemble could not constitutionally come within the statutory scheme. In other words, the right
to assemble peaceably is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship
unless it is directly related in some way with the functions of the federal government. What the Court had done to the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases it had now done to the civil rights
legislation of Congress. In exercise of its power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation Congress was allowed to legislate only
on the limited relationship between the citizen and the federal government.
But the Cruikshank case did even more damage to the civil rights
program. The Court also announced that the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment consisted exclusively of restrictions upon the
states and that it does not "add anything to the rights which one citizen
has under the Constitution ag~inst another." The only obligation resting upon the United States, said the Court, was to see that the states
did not deny their citizens the enjoyment of an equality of rights. "This
the Amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national
government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty."43 Pursuing this thought still further in Virginia v. Rives,44 the Court restated
the proposition: "The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution ... all have reference to State action exclusively, and not
to any action of private individuals."45
See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908).
2 Otto (92 U.S.) 542 (1876).
43 Id. at 555.
44 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
4r, Id. at 318. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).

41
42
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Knocked asunder thereby were all the high hopes of the amendment's framers that private action, could be reached by federal legislation. It was private action, not state action, that had caused so much
of the post-war bloodshed and atrocities in the South. It was private
action, not state action, that had been the prime motivation for all the
toil and debates that produced the Fourteenth Amendment and the surrounding legislation. Yet the framers had assumed too much and incorporated too little when they drafted the amendment. They failed to
anticipate the judicial process of interpretation with its ever-present
possibility of strict constructionism.
The elimination of private action from the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment meant the effective elimination of many of the provisions
enacted by Congress pursuant to the fifth section. In United States v.
Harris, 46 for example, the Supreme Court declared void the important
criminal conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which
made it an offense to conspire to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws or equal privileges or immunities under the laws. This
was a provision aimed at lynchings and other mob actions of an individual or private nature. Since the Fourteenth Amendment was construed to concern only state action, it could not be used to sustain such
a statutory proscription of private action. Nor could the Thirteenth
Amendment be called upon to provide validity. That amendment,
while applicable to private action, "simply abolished slavery and involuntary servitude."
The high point in the judicial negation of the abolitionists' labors
came in 1883 in the celebrated Civil Rights Cases.47 At stake was the
validity of the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
attempted to outlaw discrimination on grounds of race or color in the
enjoyment of accommodations and privileges of public conveyances,
inns, theaters and other places of public amusement. Those two sections were declared unconstitutional. Again it was pointed out that
the Fourteenth Amendment affected only action by states and their
agents and instrumentalities. A contrary interpretation "would be to
make Congress take the place of State legislatures and to supersede
them." Hence the Court majority could find no warrant for a statute
such as this, since it was directed to individual owners of conveyances,
inns, theaters, and the like who were found not to be agents of the
states. Such proprietors were free to discriminate so long as their dis46

47

106 U.S. 629, 1,S.Ct. 601 (1882).
109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
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criminatory actions had not been affirmatively authorized or permitted
by state law.
The fifth section of the amendment, designed to be the deep well
of needed legislative protection of basic civil rights, was held to give
Congress nothing more than the power "to adopt appropriate legislalation for correcting the effects" of the state laws and actions prohibited
in the first section "and thus to render them effectually null, void and
innocuous." The Court continued: "This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of it. It does not invest
Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the
domain of state legislation."
The validity of the 1875 act under the Thirteenth Amendment
fared no better. The Court conceded that the amendment was applicable to private individuals and it was willing to assume that Congress
had power thereunder to outlaw all badges and incidents of slavery in
the United States. But the Court was unable to say that the denial of
admission to an inn or theater because of one's color or race subjected
one to a form of servitude or fastened upon one any badge of slavery.
Not even the 1866 act, enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment exclusively, attempted to cover the "social rights of man and races in the
community" as the 1875 act was said to do.
Justice Harlan was alone in his brilliant but unavailing dissent. 48
He met the majority opinion at each and every point. But he could
conclude only "that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments
of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism. . . . Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interests of
liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if
need be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish, and
which they suppos~d they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental law.... [T]he court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be
48 Id. at 26. The report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, To SEctmB
THESE RIGHTS 105 (1947), stated of Justice Harlan's dissent: "So powerful a dissent
remains a living force in constitutional law and is bound to be thoughtfully considered by
any later Supreme Court when the validity of new civil rights laws comes before it for
decision." It has also been described as desezying "a high place among the writings of
Amercan statesmen marking progress in the development of democratic thought." KoNVrrz,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 13 (1947). Konvitz also gives a thorough summary
and analysis of the Civil Rights Cases, id. at 8-27.
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given to the intent with which they were adopted." No more fitting
description could be made of the Supreme Court's treatment of the
civil rights amendments and legislation.
The pattern of narrow, debilitating construction was thus established. The scope and effectiveness of the civil rights statutes became
progressively smaller as they were increasingly subjected to the cold
water of the judicial process. Additional ·sections and provisions fell
under the axe of unconstitutionality.49 All that the judiciary would
recognize as valid were those provisions dealing with situations wherein
state officials acted or misused their power or wherein rights were directly granted to private persons and guaranteed against individual infringement by the Constitution or federal laws.
The inevitable effect of these decisions was to transfer back to the
states the prime responsibility for the protection of basic civil rights, a
result which the legislators of 1866 to 1875 had expressly sought to
prevent. The South was thereby enabled to create and perpetuate its
rigid rules of segregation. Lynchings, race riots and other forms of unequal treatment were permitted to abound in the South and elsewhere
without power in the federal government to intercede. The nation in
fa<;t entered upon an· era of constitutional law, which Justice Harlan
had feared, "when· the rights of freedom and American citizenship
. cannot receive from the Nation that efficient protection which heretofore was unhesitatingly accorded to slavery and the rights of the master."
These unhappy results cannot be ascribed solelr to the judiciary;
The legislative branch also played a leading role in the drama of frustration. The civil rights statutes, even before the process of judicial de49 In United States v. Reese, 2 Otto (92 U.S.) 214 (1876), the Court held that
the third and fo~ sections of the 1870 act, not being confined in their operation to
unlawful discrimination on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude,
were beyond the permissible limits of the Fifteenth Amendment. That amendment,
while protecting the right to vote in both federal and state elections against state interference, was said to authorize Congress to provide such protection only against interferences
based on the voter's race, color or previous condition of servitude.
In. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656 (1887), the Court followed its
decision in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601 (1882), and reiterated
the invalidity of the criminal conspiracy section of the 1871 act.
The Court in James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 23 S.Ct. 678 (1903), struck down
§5 of the 1870 act, under which the defendants had been indicted for preventing Negroes
from voting in a congressional election, because it went beyond the fringe of the Fifteenth
Amendment and attempted to reach private persons as well as state officers.
Finally, in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 S.Ct. 6 (1906), the Court
outlawed §16 of the 1870 act, which purported to establish certain rights of Negro citizens,
including the right to make contracts, and to protect them against interference. Since the
attempt to protect these rights was directed against private action, the Fourteenth Amendment afforded no justification; and it was unsustainable under the Thirteenth Amendment
since interference with a man's right to contract did not force him into slavery or involuntary
servitude.
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bilitation had run its course, underwent a major legislative operation in
1873 when all federal laws were recodified and published as the Revised Statutes. 50 The provisions of the civil right statutes were separated
under unrelated chapters of these Revised Statutes and thus lost their
distinctive, coherent character. Then in 1894, when the Democrats
first won the presidency and both houses of Congress, most of the provisions protecting suffrage were repealed. 51 Still other provisions were
dropped in 1909 when the federal criminal laws were recodi:6ed.52
No effort has ever been made by subsequent Congresses to pick up
and repair the broken pieces of civil rights legislation remaining after
these wild judicial and legislative forays. All that is left today are a few
scattered remnants of a once grandiose scheme to nationalize the fundamental rights of the individual. 53 Some of these fragments have continued in existence only by virtue of long disuse or ineffectiveness, thereby
creating no pressure for their formal burial. Others have suffered from
poor draftsmanship. And the judiciary, burdened by precedents which
deny the constitutional premises on which these provisions were originally written, has reduced still further the usefulness of the laws by unreal, mechanistic interpretations. Small wonder, then, that President
Truman was forced to say in 1946 that "in its discharge of the obligations placed on it by the Constitution, the Federal Government is
hampered by inadequate !=ivil rights statutes."54

Act III-The Executive and Private Renaissance
On February 3, 1939, the Civil Rights Section of the Department
of Justice was created by the then Attorney General Frank Murphy. In
his order establishing this Section, Murphy said: 55
"The function and purpose of this unit will be to make a study
of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and Acts
of Congress relating to civil rights with reference to present condi:,o Biddle, "Civil Rights and the Federal Law," in SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY To109 at 131 (1945).
1>1 Act of Feb. 8, 1894, 28 Stat. L. 36.
1>2 35 Stat. L. 1092.
5 3 See, in general, CARR, FEDERAL PnoTEcnoN OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1947); KoNVITZ,
THE CoNSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1-106 (1947).
54 Statement of December 5, 1946, accompanying Executive Order 9808, which established the President's Committee on Civil Rights. This statement is quoted in the Com•
mittee's report, To SECURE TimsE RIGHTS vii (1947).
55 Order of the Attorney General No. 3204, Feb. 3, 1939, quoted in Putzel, "Federal
Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Appraisal,'' 99 Umv. PA. L. REv. 439 at 442
(1951). The Civil Rights Section was originally called the Civil Rights Unit, but the
name was changed in 1941 to avoid confusion in the public mind with the American Civil
Liberties Union. Id. at 442, note 16.
DAY
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tions, to make appropriate recommendations in respect thereto, and
to direct, supervise and conduct prosecutions of violations of the
provisions of the Constitution or Acts of Congress guaranteeing
civil rights to individuals."
Prior ·to the establishment of this g~lVernmental unit, no coordinated
program had ever been developed to make as effective and full use as
possible .of the minute legacy of the federal government's civil rights
powers. The Civil Rights Section, primarily concerned with the enforcement of criminal sanctions, has concentrated the energies of its
woefully inadequate staff to that end. 66 That its record "is by no means
a perfect one,"57 even within the limited range of its powers, is not a
surprising fact in the political atmosphere of the present day. 68 The basic
difficulty, of course, is the explicit and implicit weaknesses of the statutory tools, a difficulty that can be eradicated only by the unlikely pass.age of new civil rights laws by Congress.
The important federal criminal laws which are presently available to
the Civil Rights Section in its efforts to promote the civil rights of indi56

"At the present time the Civil Rights Section has a complement of seven lawyers,

all stationed in Washington. . . • Although other resources of the Department of· Justice
are available to supplement the Civil Rights Section staff, the Section is the only agency
in the Department with specialized experience in civil rights work. This small staff is
inadequate either for maximum enforcement of existing civil rights statutes, or for enforcement of additional legislation such as that recommended by this Committee." To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS 119-120 (1947). As of 1951, the staff still numbered but seven lawyers,
the original number. Putzel, "Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Appraisal,"
99 Umv. PA. L. REv. 439 at 441, note 15 (1951). In addition to the civil rights statutes,
the Civil Rights Section also administers the criminal provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Safety Appliance Act, the Hatch Act, the Railway Labor Act, and certain other
statutes.
67 To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 114 (1947). This report of the President's Committee
on Civil Rights points out six major imperfections in the federal civil rights enforcement
machinery (pp. 114-125): (I) weak statutory tools; (2) insufficient personnel in the Civil
Rights Section; (3) inadequate cooperation at times by United States Attorneys in the
£eld; (4) the Section's dependence, for its investigative work, on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, which has many other assignments; (5) hostility of local officers and local
communities; and (6) the subordinate position of the Section in the Department of Justice
and the resulting lack of prestige and authority: At the present time not all preliminary
investigations are at the request of the Section since "the Federal Bureau of Investigation
may in appropriate cases also conduct preliminary investigations either upon its own motion
or at the request of the United States Attorney. Full-scale investigations or prosecutive
action are not made without prior clearance through the Civil Rights Section." Putzel,
"Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Appraisal," 99 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 439 at
446 (1951).
58 As noted in Justice Roberts' dissent in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 at
159, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945), the Attorney General has stated: "The Department of Justice
has established a policy of strict self-limitation with regard to prosecutions under the civil
rights acts. When violations of such statutes are reported, the Department requires that
efforts be made to encourage state officials to take appropriate action under state law." Statistics quoted in the Attorney General's statement show that less than one per cent of the
complaints received by the Civil Rights Section are ever fully investigated and a still smaller
percentage ever reach the prosecution stage.
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viduals are sections 241 and 242 of Title 18 of the United States
Code and the provisions outlawing peonage and involuntary servitude. 1> 9
Section 241

Section 241, 60 a conspiracy law, makes it a crime for two or more
persons to "conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same." 61 Persons convicted can
be £.ned up to $5,000 or imprisoned up to ten years, or both. 62 This
section is derived from section 6 of the Act of May 31, 1870,63 and is
aimed at private individuals who deprive citizens of their rights under
the Constitution or federal laws. 64 Dealing only with such rights, it
has escaped the constitutional condemnation meted out to the conspiracy section of the 1871 act dealing with the deprivation of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges or immunities under the laws. 65
Section 241 was originally adopted in 1870, among other reasons,
to give sanction to the right to vote, which was guaranteed by the then
recently enacted Fifteenth Amendment. 66 But the rights within the
59 Of the peonage and involuntary servitude laws, the most important here are sections 1581(a) and 1584 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
60 18 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §241. This section was formerly known, prior to the
1948 recodi.6cation, as 18 U.S.C. (1946) §51. ;Before that it was known as section 19 of
the Criminal Code of 1909.
61 Section 241 also provides that if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway,
or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or any·
enjoyment of any right so secured, they shall he subject to the penalties therein provided. ·
This language originally began the section but now follows the words quoted in the text
above. It had its origins in "the doings of the Ku Klux [Klan]," United States v. Mosley,
238 U.S. 383 at 387, 35 S.Ct. 904 (1915), and ''has dropped into a subordinate place,
and even there has a somewhat anomalous sound." Id. at 388.
62 Prior to the 1948 recodi.6cation, this section had provided that any person who was
found guilty thereunder shall "be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor,
profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. (1946)
§51. This penalty was dropped in the recodification, the Reviser's notes explaining that
''The experience of the Department of Justice is that this unusual penalty has been an
obstacle to successful prosecutions for violations of the act." 18 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950)
§241. This is a rare example of Congress adopting one of the recommendations of the
President's Committee on Civil Rights. See To SECURE THESE fucHTs 156 (1947).
63 16 Stat. L. 140, 141. For successive revisions see table following Justice Frankfurter's opinion in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 at 83, 71 S.Ct. 581 (1951).
64 Bald\vin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656 (1887), held that a conspiracy to
drive aliens from their homes is not an offense under this section since it is expressly
limited to interferences with the rights of citizens.
Ga United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601 (1882).
66 CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 3607 et seq. (1870). But it was also designed to supplement the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 3611, 3613 (1870).
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scope of this provision, even in its original form, are not con£ined to
voting rights. Those comprehended by the section are denominated
as those "secured" by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Thus arises the ancient issue as to what rights are meant to be or constitutionally can be included in such a description.
Certainly included within the rights covered by section 241 are all
of the Slaughterhouse privileges and immunities-"that miserable bundle of bromides and irrelevancies"67 which may be·said to appertain to
United States citizens as such. Thus in United States 11. Cruikshank, 68
the earliest and leading case on section 241, the right to assemble to
petition Congress for a redress of grievances "or for anything else connected with the power or the duties of the national government" was
held by the Supreme Court to be within the constitutional reach of the
section, inasm1:1ch as "the very idea of a government, republican in
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of
grievances." Signi£icantly, the Court made it clear that the rights protected by section 241 need not be expressly "secured" by the Constitution but may be implied from "the very idea of a government, republican in form."
But the Court has gone beyond the attributes of national citizenship in delineating the rights "secured" by the Constitution and federal
laws and hence within the meaning of section 241. Also included have
been rights best described as those arising out of some relationship between the individual aggrieved citizen and the federal government, a
relationship which does not necessarily characterize the narrow concept
of national citizenship. Thus section 241 has been held applicable to
the riglit to vote in federal elections, 69 the right of a voter in a federal
election to have his ballot counted fairly,70 the right to be free from
mob violence while in the custody of a federal officer,71 and the right to
inform on violations of federal laws. 72 In United States 11. Waddell, 18
moreover, the section was applied to an interference with the right to
67

11

Frantz, "The New Supreme Court Decisions on the Federal Civil Rights Statutes,''

LAWYERS GUILD REv. 142 at 145 (1951).
68 2 Otto (92 U.S.) 542 (1876).
69Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152 (1884).
10 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S.Ct. 904

(1915); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031 (1941); United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 64
S.Ct. 1101 (1944).
11 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617 (1892).
72 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 15 S.Ct. 959 (1895); Motes v. United States, 178
U.S. 458, 20 S.Ct. 993 (1900).
73 112 U.S. 76, 5 S.Ct. 35 (1884).
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establish a claim under the Homestead Acts; this right was admittedly
not one pertaining to United States citizenship but, since it was "wholly
dependent upon the act of Congress," obstructing its exercise came
"within the purview of the statute and of the constitutional power of
Congress to make such statute." 74
On the other hand, section 241 has been held unavailable where
conspiracies have been directed toward forcing citizens to give up their
jobs or to compel them to move out of a state. 75 Equally unsuccessful
has been an attempt to invoke the section to participants in a mob ,,vhich
seized a Negro from the custody of a local sheriff and lynched him.7 6
The central issue as to section 241 comes down to the question of
whether it applies to anything more than the rights arising from the
relation of the victim and the federal government. Can it also apply to
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment against state action, rights
such as those under the due process or equal protection clauses which
do not depend upon any connection between the victim and the federal
government?77 An affirmative answer to that question would indeed
give vital substance to section 241 and give great impetus to the efforts
74 Id. at 79-80. The implications of this holding have not been authoritatively pursued
or determined. The Waddell decision and cases following it have been explained by the
Department of Justice (Circular 3356, Supp. 2, April 4, 1942, p. 4) as follows:
"The homestead laws, although they provide a machinery for obtaining title to
land in the public domain on compliance with statutory conditions, do not contain specific criminal provisions penalizing interference with homesteaders. The
theory of these cases is that the homesteader has a federal statutory right to acquire
title on compliance with conditions including the residence requirement, and that
running him off the homestead deprives him of this right, and hence falls within
section 5 I."
If carried to its logical conclusion, this theory can mean that a conspiracy to deprive
a person of his rights secured or acquired under any federal statute, such as the Social
Security Act or the Labor Management Relations Act, constitutes a violation of section 241.
No reported case ·seems to have applied this theory to rights acquired under modern statutes, though there is an implication to that effect in Pennsylvania R. System v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 267 U.S. 203, 45 S.Ct. 307 (1925). See comment, "Federal Courts-Jurisdiction over Violations of Civil Liberties by State Governments and by Private Individuals,"
39 MicH. L. REV. 284 at 296-297 (1940); Rogge, "Justice and Civil Liberties," 25 A.B.A.J.
1030 (1939); KoNVITZ, THE CoNSTITUTION AND CIVIL Ri:cHTs 44-45 (1947).
7a Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 S.Ct. 6 (1906); United States v. Wheeler,
254 U.S. 281, 41 S.Ct. 133 (1921).
76 United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564, 29 S.Ct. 690 (1909).
77 In Powe v. United States, (5th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 147, it was held that a
conspiracy to injure and oppress a newspaper editor in the exercise of his right to write
and print editorials exposing local crime did not fall within section 241 since the right to
speak and print about such matters is not "secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.'' These matters concerned the local community, not the United States, said
the court. The Supreme Court denied review of the case, 309 U.S. 679, 60 S.Ct. 717
(1940), on a petition alleging that the writing of the editorials might lead to a revelation
of violations of federal laws.
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of the Civil Rights Section to effectuate the original aims of the framers. That would be true even though the weight of precedent would
prevent the application of the section to anything but state action,
which is said to be the sole type of action affected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
This important question recently came before the Supreme Court
in United States -v. Williams. 78 In that case the defendants were acting
under color of state law in obtaining confessions from theft suspects
by physical force and brutality. They were indicted under section 241
for having conspired to injure each victim "in the free exercise and
enjoyment of the rights and privileges secured to him and protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Their conviction by a jury was
reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held
that in enacting section, 241 "the Congress had in mind the federal
-rights and privileges which appertain to citizens as such and not the
general rights extended to all persons by the [due process] clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 79 In view of the past decisions applying the
section to rights beyond those characteristic of national citizenship, this
narrow view of the court of appeals is surprising. Fortunately that view
was not sustained by the Supreme Court, even though the judgment
was affirmed by a five to four vote. The Supreme Court found itself
unable to· muster a definitive opinion as to whether. section 241 was
meant to cover rights secured by the Fourteenth Amend~ent against
state action. It split evenly, four to four, 80 on this critical question, the
decisive ninth vote of Justice Black being cast for affirmance on the independent ground of res judicata. But even the four Justices who agreed
that section 241 did not reach Fourteenth Amendment rights did so
on grounds differing from those advanced by the court of appeals.81
Thus the Supreme Cqurt in the Williams case did" no more than
pose tp.e crucial issue as to section 241 and state the opposing arguments, leaving it to a later day to render an authoritative opinion. The
1s 341 U.S. 70, 71 S.Ct. 581 (1951).
79 Williams v. United States, (5th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 644 at 648.
80 Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Jackson and Minton joined Justice Frankfurter

in
holding that section 241 did not reach Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justices Reed, Burton
and Clark joined Justice Douglas in holding to the contrary.
81 Justice Frankfurter's opinion stated, 341 U.S. 70 at 72-73: " •.. we agree that
§241 •.• does not reach the conduct laid as an offense in the prosecution here. This is
not because we deny the power of Congress to enforce by appropriate criminal sanction
every right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; nor is it
because we fully accept the course of reasoning of the court below. We base our decision
on the history of §241, its text and context, the statutory framework in which it stands,
its practical and judicial application-controlling elements in construing a federal criminal
provision that affects the ,vise adjustment between State responsibility and national control
of essentially local affairs."
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narrow view of the statute, as espoused by Justice Frankfurter, and the
broad view, as stated by Justice Douglas, may be summarized as
follows:
Narrow View
1. Interference with civil rights by state
officers was dealt with by section 17 of
the 1870 act, now 18 U.S.C. (1950)
Sec. 242, together with the general conspiracy statute enacted in 1867, now 18
U.S.C. (1950) Sec. 371. Hence there
was no need to include conspiracies by
state officers within section 24 I.

2. Section 241 was designed to reach only
private action, not action by state officers. The history of the times, especially
the activities of the Klan, shows that
private lawlessness was a major evil and
hence bears out this interpretation.
3. Prior decisions, starting with United
States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto (92 U.S.)
542 (1876), have interpreted section
241 so as to protect only those rights
arising from the relation of the victim
and the federal government.
4. To construe section 241 to reach Fourteenth Amendment rights would raise
needless constitutional issues as to vagueness, since it does not contain the word
"willfully," which was all that rendered section 242 constitutional. Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).

Broad View
I. If the rights "secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United
States," as used in section 242, are not
restricted to rights which the government can secure against interference by
private :persons, it is hard to understand
why rights "secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,''
as used in section 241, are so restricted.
2. The 1870 act, of which section 241
was a part, was framed to enforce both
the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth
Amendments, thus including rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against state infringement.
3. Prior decisions which have refused to
apply section 241 to Fourteenth Amendment rights have done so only because
the action complained of was individual
rather than state action. They did not
hold that Fourteenth Amendment rights
were outside the scope of section 241.
4. The vagueness problem does not arise
where, as here, the jury is instructed
that conspiracy requires specific intent
and since an "intent to accomplish an
object cannot be alleged more clearly
than by statin17 that parties conspired to
accomplish it.'

There the matter now rests. The choice is between an interpretation of section 241 which confines it to strictly private conspiracies
or one which expands it to include conspiracies by those acting under
color of state authority. The former would include only those rights
arising out of some relationship between the victim and the federal government, while the latter would reach all the due process and equal
protection rights which do not depend upon such a relationship. The
former interpretation also reads section 241 as though it had been written in 1870 with all the subsequent judicial perversions of the Fourteenth Amendment in mind, whereas the latter interpretation is more
consistent with what the framers clearly had in mind. Section 241 thus
awaits further adjudication.
Section 242

Section 24282 makes it a misdemeanor for anyone, under color of
law, "willfully" to subject any inhabitant of any state "to the deprivation
82 18 U.S.C. (Supp. Ill, 1950) §242. This section was formerly known, prior to the
1948 recodification, as 18 U.S.C. (1946) §52. Before that it was known as section 20 of
the Criminal Code of 1909.
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of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments,
pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of
citizens." Punishment is fixed at fines up to $1,000 or imprisonment
up to one year, or both.
This section is derived from section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866,83 a provision designed primarily at that time to protect Negroes. 84
It extends its protection to "inhabitants," in contrast to section 24l's
confinement to "citizens." Two separate offenses are created: (1) willfully subjecting any inhabitant to the deprivation of rights secured or
protected by the Constitution or federal laws;. (2) willfully subjecting
any inhabitant to different punishments because of his alienage, color
or race. A violation of either part of section 242 must be both "willful"
and "under color of law." And unlike section 241, this statute may be
violated by a single individual; it is not a conspiracy statute. But, as
Justice Rutledge noted in Screws v. United States, 85 in spite of these
differences in wording between sections 241 and 242, there are "no
differences in the baste rights guarded. Each protects in a different
way the rights and privileges secured to individuals by the Constitu_tion."
Prosecutions under section 242 are probably the most important
work of the· Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice,86 which
has undertaken to revitalize and develop that statute to the limits of
its capabilities. Prior to the establishment of this unit in 1939, section
242 had lain virtually dormant for many years, being involved in only
two reported cases.87
One of the first cases arising under the renaissance of section 242
resulted in a Supreme Court decision validating the application of the
statute to an interference with the right to vote in federal elections. 88
The interference involved the willful alteration and false counting
83 14 Stat. L. 27. For successive revisions see table following Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 at 83, 71 S.Ct. 581 (1951).
84 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 at 327-328, 61 S.Ct. 1031, note 10
(1941).
85 325 U.S. 91 at 119, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945).
86 Biddle, "Civil Rights and the Federal Law," in SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY
ToDAY 109 at 139-140 (1945).
s1 United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730 (1882); United States v. Stone, 188 F. 836
(1911).
ss United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031 (1941).
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and certification of ballots cast in a Louisiana primary election
for Democratic candidates for representative in Congress. The
Court held that the right of the people to . choose their representatives in Congress, as provided for by article I, section 2, of the
Constitution, includes the right of qualified voters within a state to
cast their ballots and have them fairly counted. That right, the Court
said, extends to primary elections. And even though primary elections
were unknown at the time of original enactment, both sections 241 and
242 were held to be constitutionally applicable to the situation. Thus
much of the federal government's power to punish election frauds,
seemingly lost in 1894 when many of the franchise sections of the civil
rights statutes were repealed, seems to have been recovered by this latter
day restoration of section 242. 89
But the most important development affecting section 242 has
been the recent emphasis on the word "willfully." The resulting limitations on the effectiveness of the statute have been both extensive and
alarming. This development, coming a few years after the use of section 242 had been revived, marked the Supreme Court's decision in
Screws v. United States. The very constitutionality of section 242 was
there made to turn upon the requirement of "willfulness." The case
involved several state police officers who indulged in "a shocking and
revolting episode in law enforcement"; they beat a Negro to death in
the course of arresting him on a warrant charging him with the theft of
a tire. They were indicted under section 242 for having "willfully"
caused the Negro to be deprived of certain rights secured or protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment: (I) the right not to be deprived of life
without due process of law; and (2) the right to be tried by due process
of law and, if found guilty, to be punished in accordance with the
laws of the state. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 90
89 Other cases bearing upon the application of sections 241 and 242 in federal elections
prior to the Classic case are: Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152 (1884);
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S.Ct. 904 (1915); United States v. Gradwell,
243 U.S. 476, 37 S.Ct. 407 (1917); United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 38 S.Ct.
269 (1918); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 41 S.Ct. 469 (1921). A decision
subsequent to Classic case is United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 64 S.Ct. 1101 (1944),
where the Court sanctioned the use of section 241 to a situation where there had been
wholesale ballot box stuffing; this was held to amount to interference with the right to have
one's vote counted as cast. See Rotnem, "Clarifications of the Civil Rights' Statutes," 2
BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 252 (1942).
90 Screws v. United States, (5th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 662.

I-352

MrcHIGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

The arguments before the Supreme Court centered upon the validity of section 242 in making criminal those activities which are in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was
urged that no ascertainable standard of guilt was provided, that the
broad and varying interpretations of the due process clause made it impossible for a state officer to know or guess when he might be violating that clause, and that section 242 was therefore unconstitutional
on grounds of vagueness.
The Supreme Court, however, was unable to arrive at any clearcut decision apart from agreeing as to the basic constitutionality of section 242. Six of the Justices took the view that the statute was constitutionally valid. But four91 of these six were deeply troubled by the
vagueness argument and thought the statute could be saved only by
interpreting the word "willfully" to require "a specific intent to deprive
_a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of
law" or "made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution
or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them." Examples given were "a local officer who persists in enforcing a type of
ordinance which the Court has held invalid," or one who "continues
to select juries in a manner which Hies in the teeth of decisions of the
Court." 92 These four Justices concluded that a new trial was necessary
so that the jury might properly be instructed as to this requirement of
willfulness, so newly-found to be the constitutional crutch of section
242.
.
The other two Justices believing the statute valid were Justices
Murphy and Rutledge. Neither was impressed by the vagueness argument; they were both willing to sustain the conviction as it stood. Justice Rutledge, however, voted with the four who favored reversal and
retrial so that there might be an effective disposition of the case. The
other three Justices,03 speaking through Justice Roberts, felt that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague, that the 1909 addition of the
word "willfully" did not save it, and that in any event it was intended to
be applied only to unconstitutional conduct of state officers unauthorized by state law. As to this latter point, the other members of the Court
thought that the statutory phrase "under color of law" was designed to
cover misuse of power granted police officers. by the state, not just action under an unconstitutional state statute.94
91 Chief Justice Stone, Justices Black, Reed, and Douglas, with the latter writing the
opinion.
02 325 U.S. 91 at 103-104.
93 Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson.
94 See Hale, "Unconstitutional Acts as Federal Crimes," 60 HARv. L. REv. 65 (1946).
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This requirement of willfulness has proved a major obstacle in
the way of effective use of_section 242. It is difficult to convince a jury
that the defendant police officer knew of a specific federal right as
spelled out by a badly-split Supreme Court decision and willfully intended to deprive his victim of that right. That difficulty was demonstrated by the acquittal that the retrial in the Screws case produced.
Some of the hardship, though, was removed by a later decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that evidence that a
police officer mistreated a prisoner out of personal malice or spite is
not inconsistent with the conclusion that the officer also willfully intended to deprive his victim of constitutional rights. 95
The constitutionality of section 242 and its requirement of willfulness were recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Williams 11.
United States,96 this time by a close but definitive vote of five to
four. The defendant in this case, a state police officer, had coerced a
confession from a suspect by the use of third-degree methods. A verdict
of guilty was rendered by the jury, after being properly instructed on
the issue of willfulness. Repeating the arguments advanced in the
Screws case, the defendant urged that the numerous split decisions of
the Court in cases involving allegedly coerced confessions made it impossible to ascertain any definite standard of guilt. The Court dismissed this contention by saying, "It is as plain as a pikestaff that the
present confessions would not be allowed in evidence whatever the
school of thought concerning the scope and meaning of the Due Process
Clause."97
The central problem as to section 242-its constitutional validity
in relation to vindication of due process rights-thus has been authoritatively answered, though by the uncomfortable margin of one vote.
By the slender margin of that vote, the victim of police brutality has
some chance of having the federal government punish the evil-doers
where the state declines to take action against them. It is a chance complicated by the requirement of willfulness on the part of the police officers to violate the specific right involved. But it is nonetheless an important and desirable chance. Whether it can survive future personnel
changes on the Supreme Court remains to be seen.
Section 242 has also been applied to police brutality resulting in the
infringement by state officers of freedom of speech, freedom of press,
Crews v. United States, (5th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 746.
341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576 (1951).
97 Id. at 101.
95

96
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freedom of religion and the right to equal protection of the laws.98 It
was. said that the right to equal protection could be violated by a police
officer who merely failed to discharge his duty to protect the victims of
mob violence and to arrest the perpetrators. In other words, a state
may violate the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to give effective enforcement to its own laws and an officer may thereby violate section 242.
Such a doctrine, if followed and developed, would effectuate one of the
original aims of the amendment's framers and would give substance
to the hope that section 242 can give effective vindication to the constitutional rights of individuals.
Private Remedies

In addition to the few criminal sanctions inherited from the civil
rights statutes of yesteryear, two provisions for civil damages for violations of civil rights remain from the Reconstruction program.99
Section 41 of Title 8 of the United States Code, derived from the
1866 and 1870 acts, does no more than make a general statement of
constitutional policy and carries with it no civil or criminal sanctions.
It states merely that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every state to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings as is enjoyed by white citizens; moreover, all such- persons shall be subject to like punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
As was said by Justice Strong in Strauder v. West Virginia,1° 0 this
section puts in. the form of a statute what was substantially ordained
in the Fourteenth Amendment. It contains a partial list of the rights
which the amendment's framers thought they were protecting when
they placed the privileges and immunities clause into the amendment.
The only purpose now served by section 41 is as an incomplete compendium of rights the violation of which may give rise to civil suit under
other sections of Title 8.
Of far greater utility is section 43 of Title 8. It provides that every
person who, under color of state law, subjects any person within the
jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" shall be
liable to the injured party in an action at law or equity. Derived from
1

os Catlette v. United States, (4th Cir. 1943) 132 F. (2d) 902.
99 8 u.s.c. (1946) §§43, 47(3).
100 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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the 1871 act, this section concerns state action onlv. It is the civil counterpart of section 242 of Title 18, the criminal sanction directed at the
deprivation of such rights. But unlike section 242, section 43 is not
burdened with a statutory or constitutional requirement of willfulness.
The sole problem here relates to the rights, privileges and immunities
which may be said to be secured by the Constitution and federal
laws.101
As stated by Justice Stone in Hague 11. C.I.O.,1° 2 section 43 "extends broadly to deprivation by state action of the rights, privileges and
immunities secured to persons by the Constitution. It thus includes
the Fourteenth Amendment and such privileges and immunities as
are secured by the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as
by the privileges and immunities clause of that Amendment. It will
also be observed that they are those rights secured to persons, whether
citizens of the United States or not, to whom the Amendment in terms
extends the benefit of the due process and equal protection clauses."
Section 47(3) of Title 8 gives a civil damage remedy to anyone who
is the victim of a conspiracy to deprive him of "the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws...."
This provision is roughly analogous to the present criminal conspiracy
section (section 241 of Title 18). It owes its origin to the 1871 act,
the Ku Klux Klan Act, which was designed to give relief against outrages perpetrated by such private organizations as the Klan.
For many years section 47(3) lay dormant, probably suffering from
the effects of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Harris.103
The Court there held unconstitutional the criminal conspiracy provision of the 1871 act. That provision, which was the companion of the
present section 47(3), described criminal conspiracies in language
indistinguishable from that used in section 47(3) to describe civil
conspiracies. The Fourteenth Amendment having been construed to
affect state action only and the 1871 act having been enacted to effectuate that amendment, the Court held that criminal sanctions imposed on
private conspiracies were without constitutional warrant.
101 In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783 (1951), the Supreme Court
had before it a suit for damages under both sections 43 and 47(3) against members of the
California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, known as the
Tenney Q>mmittee. It was alleged that these members had conspired to abuse their powers
to intimidate and silence the plaintiff, without any legislative purpose. The Court held that
from the allegations of the complaint it appeared that the members were acting within
their legitimate legislative field and that they were entitled to the traditional legislative
immunity from civil liability.
102 307 U.S. 496 at 526, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939).
103 106 U.S. 629, I S.Ct. 601 (1882).
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Recently, however, section 47(3) has come to life in a series of decisions104 culminating if not ending in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Collins v. Hardyman. 105 It was there alleged that the defendants had
conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of the· right to assemble for discussion
of national issues and to petition the national government for redress
of grievances. Because of their disagreement with and desire to suppress the_ views of the plaintiffs, the defendants forcibly broke up the
meeting. The Supreme Court held that section 47(3), by virtue of its
language, did not apply to this set of facts. According to the Court,
the facts here showed merely a conspiracy to violate or invade rights, not
one to deprive the plaintiffs of "equal protection" or "equal privileges
and immunities" as section 47(3) requires. To constitute the latter,
the invasion of rights would have to be accompanied by "some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing
so."106 Three justices dissented, arguing that the right asserted by the
plaintiffs was not derived from the Fourteenth Amendment but from
the "very idea of government, republican in form" 101 and that Congress
· in section 47(3) had exercised its undoubted power to create a federal
cause of action in favor of persons injured by private individuals through
the abridgement of federally created constitutional rights.108
As a practical matter, the Collins decision has reduced section 47(3)
to the vanishing point. If the conspiracy must be directed toward a
manipulation_ of the law or its agencies, thereby causing inequality of
protection, few if any plaintiffs can allege or prove such a causal chain.
It is far better and easier to use section 43, with its uncomplicated and
broad scope. But even were a plaintiff able to bring his complaint within the standards set by· the Collins decision, the Court indicated that
he would then be confronted with "constitutional problems of the first
magnitude that, in the light of history, are not without difficulty. These
would include issues as to congressional power under and apart from
the Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from national as distinguished from state citizen104 See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397 (1944); Viles v. Symes,
(10th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 828; Robeson v. Fanelli, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 62;
Ferrer v. Fi:onton Exhibition Co., (5th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 954; Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 240.
105 341 U.S. 651, 71 S.Ct. 937 (1951).
106 Id. at 661.
101 Id. at 663, quoting from United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto (92 U.S.) 542 at
552 (1876).
10s 341 U.S. 651 at 663.
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ship, and the question of separability of the Act in its application to
those two classes of rights."109
Hardy indeed would be the plaintiff who could drive his complaint
safely round all these constitutional roadblocks set up by the Court.
The Harris precedent alone might be enough for the Court to declare
section 47(3) unconstitutional. He would be better advised to concentrate his efforts under section 43. There alone does the individual
stand a fair chance of securing pecuniary relief for the damages suffered at the hands of those who are bent on violating or ignoring his
constitutional rights.
Epilogue

The civil rights program of the Reconstruction era has thus come
down to a pitiful handful of statutory provisions, most of which are
burdened by the dead weight of strict constructionism. The great fervor
with which the elected representatives of the people decided to nationalize civil rights has been "cooled by the breath of judicial construction."110 One by one, the constitutional amendments and the civil
rights statutes have been blown down by that breath. The few stark
remnants that remain are mute testimony to the power of the judiciary
to render impotent the expressed will of the people.
The legislative program of the post-Civil War days was premised
on the belief that the fundamental rights of the individual should be
defined and enforced by the federal government. But the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to accept that premise. It has substituted
its belief that civil rights lie within the realm of state power and that
any federal attempt to encroach on that power is to be viewed narrowly
and suspiciously. The Court has expressed its belief so many times that
it would necessitate a judicial and constitutional upheaval of the first
magnitude to undo what the Court has done.
It is doubtful if much can be done by way of existing federal statutes to implement effectively the civil rights of individuals. There are
some encouraging signs in the application of some of those statutes to
the broad rights which have come to be protected against state action
under the due process clause. But the greatest source of violations, the
109 Id. at 659. See note, "Protection of Pr,ivileges and Immunities of United States
Citizens Against Interference by Individuals," 1 DuXE B.J. 63 (1951).
110 Biddle, "Civil Rights and the Federal Law," in SAPl!GUAIUlING CIVIL Wl!RTY
ToDAY 109 at 127 (1945).
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actions of private individuals, are beyond the power of present statutes
to reach in any substantial degree. And in the present political climate
it seems doubtful that any new congressional legislation will soon be
forthcoming, especially along the effective lines recommended by the
President's Committee on Civil Rights. 111 But as that Committee
pointed out: 112
"The adoption of specific legislation, the implementation of
laws or the development of new administrative policies and procedures ·cannot alone bring us all the way to full civil rights. The
strong arin of government can cope with individual acts of discrimination, injustice and violence. But in one sense, the actual
infringements of civil rights by public or private persons are only
symptoms. They reB.ect the imperfections of our social order, and
the ignorance and moral weaknesses of some of our people.
"There are social and psychological conditions which foster
civil rights; there are others which imperil them. In a world forever tottering on the brink of war, civil rights will be precarious
at best. In a nation wracked by depression and widespread economic insecurity, the inclination to consider civil rights a luxury
will be more easily accepted. We need peace and prosperity for
their own sake; we need them to secure our civil rights as well.
We must make constructive efforts to create an appropriate national outlook-a climate of public opinion which will outlaw
individual abridgments of personal freedom, a climate of opinion
as free from prejudice as we can make it."
111 To SECURE THESE RicHTs
112 Id. at 133.

149-173 (1947).

